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COMMENTARY
WHEN INCOMMENSURABLE VALUES
CONFLICT-THOUGHTS ON Mandelker's
ENVIRONMENT AND EQurrY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE.
Daniel R. Mandelker. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1981.
Pp. 162.
Bailey H. Kuklin*
I.
Governmental regulation of an activity implies a certain
balance of values. Although the worth of governmental regula-
tion has become politically controversial, discussion has gener-
ally focused on its economic benefits and costs and little attempt
is made to particularize and judge other underlying values. This
incomplete assessment is clearly apparent in the areas of envi-
ronmental and land use control. This commentary analyzes this
phenomenon in the context of Daniel R. Mandelker's recent
book Environment and Equity: A Regulatory Challenge.
In this book, Mandelker objectively examines the ethical, le-
gal and practical problems of environment and land use controls.
He describes the broad conflicts that these problems create in
the legislatures, courts, and marketplace. The author's endeavor
to introduce the reader to these areas of governmental activity is
generally successful.
As vehicles for his discussion, Mandelker uses two models:
exclusionary zoning1 as an illustration of land use controls and
coastal management 2 as an example of newer environmental reg-
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School
1 Exclusionary zoning is described by Mandelker as "a tightening of customary resi-
dential land-use regulations to exclude housing for lower-income groups," by restricting
the division of land to very large lots, or by restricting residential use of land to single
family dwellings. D. R. Mandelker, ENvmoNmwr mD EQurr p. 80 (1981) [hereinafter
cited by page number only].
2According to Mandelker, coastal management regulations are designed to "prevent
the destruction of coastal existence value by diverting land development to inland loca-
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ulations. The selection of these two examples presents a formi-
dable challenge since they elicit many disputed values. An objec-
tive look at governmental intervention is even more difficult in
view of the book's probable readership - putative policymakers
concerned with business and industry.3 Beliefs commonly associ-
ated with business and industry are not generally thought to in-
clude a sensitivity to delicate coastlines and a concern for special
opportunities for homeownership by the disadvantaged. The
book's intended readers are thus less likely to be receptive to
more settled regulation if they see these two models as typical.
Other governmental controls are less problematic. A more bal-
anced view might have resulted had Mandelker included less de-
batable examples of regulation such as pollution legislation or
ordinary conflicting use zoning. These are grounded on more
widely shared values and established regulatory systems.
Pollution regulation, for example, is more amenable to the
economic analysis considered in the second chapter of
Mandelker's book and would have served as the focus of an in-
formative study. Unlike the models chosen by Mandelker, pol-
lution controls can be forcefully supported by the acceptance of
only a few axiological or value judgments which are centered
within the constellation of values identified with the business
community. Modern economic theory, which is based upon the
rational person, the ideal marketplace, cost internalization, non-
subsidization and optimal resource allocation, theoretically dis-
favors pollution externalities. When in practice industries resist
pollution controls, they typically avoid confrontation with the
basic values and rationalize their reluctance by: (1) denying the
significance of pollution-related injuries; (2) emphasizing the ur-
gent domestic need for lower costs to maintain viable competi-
tive industries; and (3) expostulating on the evils and inefficien-
cies of governmental regulation. The first point can be hollow
sounding rhetoric, as is evident by the tobacco industry's en-
deavors. The second point ignores the virtues of a minimized
tions where it will not be environmentally harmful." p. 14.
' The book's dust jacket states that this book is aimed at a broad range of "policy-
makers" including "lawyers, economists, political scientists, financiers and adminis-
trators."
4 In 1969, the Tobacco Institute published, in an advertisement, a Tobacco Research
Council release citing Dr. C.C. Little's finding that "there is no demonstrated causal rela-
tionship between smoking and any disease." N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1969, at 23. As part of
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subsidy of industry rationally legislated by direct knowledge of
its true costs and benefits and paid for equitably rather than by
haphazard taxation of employees, consumers and neighbors. The
political and bureaucratic foibles criticized in the third point are
concerns worthy of continual vigilance, and are indeed an anath-
ema to an efficient marketplace. Intervention for minor disutili-
ties is, therefore, not worthwhile. Pollution must pass a thresh-
old before governmental intervention is merited."
The full thrust of the economic analysis in the second chap-
ter is diminished for those readers who lack some knowledge of
microeconomics. Further elaboration of basic economic theory
as it relates to modern governmental regulatory policy would
have been worthwhile. For instance, the economic theory of
"Pareto optimality" draws upon basic notions of rationality, i.e.,
what we expect rational persons to do in a free market, and
points to the conclusion that an ideal free market is precluded if
one can freely pollute." In accordance with the Pareto theory,
the optimal allocation of resources follows from choices by pur-
chasers who fully incorporate into their decisions the private
and social costs of goods. Market trading theoretically will be
facilitated until "no one can be made better off without an-
other's being made worse off." (p. 6). As an illustration, remain-
ing within the context of pollution controls, more buyers would
choose clothing made of cotton and wool, instead of synthetic
fibers, if they included in their purchasing determination the ad-
ditional costs of longterm atmospheric deterioration, disease,
the industry's $48,000, six week advertising campaign, the Tobacco Institute ran a full
page advertisement to this effect. Id. at Mar. 5, 1969, at 29, col 1.
5 See STEwART & KarEn, ENVINMENAL LW AND POucy 113 (1978); Brayer, Ana-
lyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92
HARv. L. REv. 549 (1979).
4 Mandelker defines Pareto optimality (he refers to it as "Pareto Rule") in the fol-
lowing manner. "When only the participants in the trade benefit or bear costs, and when
benefits and costs are defined by the participants' value structure, the outcome is effi-
cient in the sense that no one can be made better off without another's being made worse
off." p. 6. The theory is also defined as follows: "Outcome A is defined as Pareto-optimal
if it is impossible to move to any other state without making at least one person worse
off in this new social state than he was under A." B. AcKERMAN, ECONoMIc FoMAToNs
OF PROPERTY LAw xii (1975). Many analyses now use the Pareto Superiority or Kaldor-
Hicks test for determining efficient transactions. It "requires not that no one be made
worse off by a change in allocation of resources but only that the increase in value be
sufficiently large that the losers can be fully compensated." IL PosNER, TrM EcoNoAUcs
OF Jusncs 91 (1981).
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building damage, and cleaning bills caused by petro-chemical
pollution. These factors raise the recognized cost of synthetic
fibers and made natural cloth appear relatively cheaper.
A manufacturer that dumps its garbage (pollution) without
restriction upon its neighbors creates an "external diseconomy"
because it need not include the cost of garbage collection (pollu-
tion control) in the price of its products.8 Other goods will be
underproduced while this one is overproduced, resulting in the
misallocation of resources. The manufacturer is, in effect, receiv-
ing a public or neighborhood subsidy for his product and al-
though such a subsidy might well be socially desireable, an in-
formed political decision in this regard is not possible without
accurate cost information. Mandatory internalization of the ex-
ternal cost will require the manufacturer to increase prices ac-
cordingly, thereby permitting the price mechanism of the mar-
ket and political processes to operate more efficiently.'
7 An economic "externality" exists "whenever the activities of one person affect the
welfares or production functions of other people who have no direct control over that
activity." R. DORFMAN & N. DORFMAN, ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT SELECTED
READINGS xvi (1972) [hereinafter cited as Dorfman]. The effect may be an "external
diseconomy," which exists "when an action taken by an economic unit results in uncom-
pensated costs to others." E. MANSFIELD, MncROECONOMICs: THEORY & APPLICATIONS 373
(Shorter 3d ed. 1979).
8 Theoretically, the neighbors could bargain with the manufacturer to eliminate the
external costs and purchase the manufacturer's entitlement to pollute. This is the thesis
of the famous Coase Theorem. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON 1, 6-
9 (1960). With the purchase price, the manufacturer could install pollution-control de-
vices. As long as the value of preventing pollution is greater than the value of polluting,
the parties will reach an agreement beneficial to all. Id. at 9.
However, the Coase theory fails to consider the transaction costs of the bargaining
process. Organizing an entire neighborhood exposed to pollution clearly will be costly
especially where the polluted area is large. Such costs may also include "freeloader ex-
penses," which occur when certain neighbors withhold their shares of the purchase price
in the expectation that others will pay enough to make up the difference. These second-
ary costs might prevent effective bargaining. For a discussion of these transaction costs,
see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 44-46 (2d ed. 1977) (sources of high transac-
tion costs include the number of parties and possible alternatives to bargaining), See
also M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTmE ACTION 2 (2d ed. 1971) (whereas self-interested
individuals in a group will act to further their individual interests, without coercion or
separate incentive, they will not act to achieve a common or group objective); Regan,
The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 427, 437 (1972) (assumption of
zero transaction costs is an unrealistic and simplified notion).
An externality may have an inverse effect and create an external economy. The
industry's presence might rise surrounding property values if related industries move
into the vicinity. Internalization of this benefit will allow the enterprise to lower its
prices resulting in more accurate costs to its customers. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 7,
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Resolution of conflicting land uses by means of nuisance law
and ordinary zoning enactments is generally subject to an analy-
sis of externalities more readily than the topics chosen by
Mandelker. The smoke pollution of a factory, if found to be a
substantial, unreasonable interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of a neighbor's land, gives rise to legal liability in nui-
sance10 and to constitutionally permissible grounds for zoning
regulations. 1 Many other disruptions of the neighborhood, how-
ever, are less well recognized by either courts or legislatures and
demonstrate some of the nuances of the analysis. For instance,
traffic interference and damage to roadbeds caused by a manu-
facturer's trucks may realistically be considered part of the cost
of the final product. Courts ordinarily will not grant nuisance
relief for such indirect injuries and zoning will not be an effec-
tive remedy once the plant's initial construction has begun. 2
Moreover, in a complex, inter-related economic community, it
becomes as hard to characterize indirect costs as to qualify
them. An examination of the external costs incurred by the in-
troduction of industrial development to a residential neighbor-
hood fails to reveal which costs are rightfully attributable to the
manufacturer. The depression of residential real estate values by
the situs of a manufacturing plant, without more, may either be
a cost imposed on the neighborhood or the restriction of such
industrial development may be a cost imposed by the neighbor-
hood."3 A similar indeterminacy arises from an analysis of
at 372 ("an external economy occurs when an action taken by an economic unit results in
uncompensated benefits to others.").
10 See generally W. PRoSSFR, LAw oF ToRTS §§ 86-91 (4th ed. 1971); RrATEmENT
(SEcoND) ToRTs §§ 822, 824, 827-83.0 (1977).
' See R. AND soN, Ai-smcN LAw oF ZONMNG § 7.26, at 697 (2d ed. 1977) (courts
have upheld zoning regulations that protect landowners from noise, dirt, smoke, and
machinery).
112 See generally 58 AM. Jun. 2d Nuisance § 638 (1971) (citing Coon v. Utah Constr.
Co., 119 Utah 446, 228 P.2d 997 (1951)). But cf. Gribbon v. Interstate Motor Freight
Sys., 18 Ill. App. 2d 96, 151 N.E.2d 443 (1958).
13 Some commentators argue that all costs of land use conflicts are indifferently re-
ciprocal and theoretically cannot be blamed upon one user or the other. See Kennedy,
Cost Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems, 33 STAN. L REv. 387, 395-96, 398 (1981)
(land use costs are joint costs); Coase, supra note 8, at 2, 27-28 (reciprocal costs). For a
detailed outline of cost attribution, see G. CALABHSt, THa CosTS OF AccmPMr 131-97
(1971).
Despite the aforementioned approach, most citizens, judges, and legislators have lit-
tle difficulty attributing the conflict costs to one party. the manufacturer is at fault for
pollution of the neighborhood. This occurs because our social choices are based, generally
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Mandelker's exclusionary zoning model: does the introduction of
low-cost housing impose external costs on pre-existing middle
and upper-income neighborhood housing or does the protection
of the more expensive housing impose external costs on poten-
tial low-cost housing.14 The ordinary observer would generally
find the low-cost housing to create the external diseconomy.
Then the issues arise whether the costs ought to be imposed
upon the more expensive neighborhood and, if so, by whom and
how is it to be paid.
The economic perspective is not the only consideration.
Governmental intervention to resolve conflicts over resources in-
volves the implementation of other value judgments as well. The
propriety of such intervention, as Mandelker suggests, may be
suspect. (p. 1). To glimpse the weight these other values have in
the public decision for regulation, it is useful to consider the ba-
sic choices of society.
Citizens must make fundamental value choices to determine
the broad goals of the government. This necessitates, according
to one analysis, 5 the balancing of two basic polarities: collectiv-
ism and equalitarianism; egoism and altruism. The Western de-
mocracies usually favor equalitarianism and altruism.10 From
this orientation flow our laws and social customs. Equalitarian-
ism infers individualism; each individual is entitled to the same
freedoms and benefits under the law.1 7 Civil and political rights
are formulated in theories of liberal democracy. 8 Property
rights are idealized by the liberties of the free market, reaching a
limit in laissez-faire capitalism. One should not be compelled to
subsidize the goods of another by being subjected to higher
speaking, on the value judgment of ordinary persons not scientific policymakers. See B.
AcKimA, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 25-29, 97-100 (1977) (distinction
between ordinary views and scientific theory).
" See text following note 38 infra.
Is The basic goals examined here are from K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS
ENEMms 99-105 (2d rev. ed. 1950).
Is Id. at 101.
17 Mandelker defines this principle as horizontal'equity, that is, "individuals in the
same position [are] to receive the same benefits." p. 27. See Patterson, in My PsrLoSo-
PHY OF LAW 231, 240 (1941) (resolution of conflicts should be by methods that are impar-
tial and equal); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAV. L.
REv. 593, 623-24 (1958).
"" See H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 87-90 (1949).
[Vol. 49: 245
ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY
prices from misallocation resources."9
Equality is the underpinning of the liberties of democracy.
Economic equality connotes freedom of contract. Social equality
suggests freedom of action. This liberty obviously is not unlim-
ited, but involves a reciprocal relationship: one's liberty to act
counterbalances another's liberty to be free from that action.2 0
Government is the instrumentality through which the reciprocal
liberties are delineated. The classical liberty expression of the
line is J.S. Mill's "harm" principle." This measures the exercise
of the police power in regulating society's health, safety, morals
and general welfare. When a government exercises its power
against material harms, such as injury to person (assault) or
property (burglary), intervention is deemed proper. As the
harms are more attenuated, the desirability of governmental in-
tervention is debatable. The nebulosity of the harm principle is
particularly evident in defining the morality within the police
power. A well-known standard is whether the practice is im-
moral in the eyes of all "rights-minded members of society" re-
gardless of "whence the community of thought comes."22 History
demonstrates the dangers of this standard.23 In the determina-
tion of the less immediate harms, other values often weigh in the
final balance.
II.
Unlike the easily defended regulation of pollution, the
'9 See IL DWoRKIN, Punuc & PRivATE MoLrtrAvY 131-32 (1978).
20 See AL COHEN, REASON AND LAw 5 (1950); J. AEG, RIcHTS, JUsncE AND THE
BouNDs OF LmERTY 31 (1980); L KuLSm, supra note 18, at 75-76. See generally L Bn-
LN, FouR EssAYs ON LIaBErY (1969). Grimke, in 1848, put it as well as anyone:
The exercise of unrestricted freedom by all, when all are free, is a self contra-
diction. It supposes a power in each to invade the rights of others, in which
case liberty would fall to the ground and no one be free .... My liberty of
action is an habitual restraint upon the conduct of others when they attempt
to invade my rights, and their liberty is in circumstances a restraint upon me.
F. GIUMKn, THE NATURs Am TENDENCY OF F a INSTITUTIONS 192 (J. Ward ed. 1968).
s1 J. S. MLL, UTILIAIANM, LmmrTY AND REPPxsETATIVE GovERNmaVr 95-96
(1951) ("the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others').
2 P. DEvmN, Tan ENFORCEMENT OF MoRALS 22-23 (1965).
23 See Hart, Immorality and Treason, in MoRALrrY AND THE LAw 49, 53 (R. A. Was-
serstrom ed. 1971) (the argument that public harms are those which are considered im-
moral by right-minded citizens may justify "burning of old women for witch craft or...
punishing people for associating with those of a different race or colour").
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greater analytical and normative complexities of coastal manage-
ment are evident from Mandelker's discussion. It is arguable
whether the diminution of natural resources and the destruction
of the ecology ought to be legally remediable. If such exploita-
tion of the environment were to be redressed, appropriate relief
must be fashioned by the courts and legislatures. Classical eco-
nomic analysis depreciates many of the considerations favoring a
remedy. Mandalker states, furthermore, that when environmen-
talists try to justify environmental protection with factual evi-
dence of benefits to society, they take the risk that the "scien-
tific evidence may not support their assertion, and unregulated
land development may not impair environmental areas" (p. 24)
and, therefore, he asserts there is a "necessity for the implicit
value judgments that underlie environmental land-use regula-
tion" (p. 24).
Some of the arguments advanced to provide needed support
for environmentalism are problematic. One is that the psycho-
logical harm to environmental sympathizers is worthy of protec-
tion.2 4 This point seems to bring with it the same risks as de-
lineating immoral practices by the eyes of "right minded
members of society."25 Another contention is that irreversible
ecological damage will impinge upon future generations, which
for reasons often unspecified, 6 is held to be unfair. But many
have denied that future generations have such a claim.2 7
Other arguments in support of controls urge consideration
of additional social values that are normally not subject to mar-
ketplace evaluation. Aesthetic and existential values are es-
poused, perhaps as absolutes, in language both poetic and mysti-
cal. They appear in an invocation of an anonymous Hawaiian
Il See B. AcKERmAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN rHE LmERAL STATE 178 (1980) (there is con-
siderable debate as to whether psychological harm qualifies as harmful); Kennedy, supra
note 13, at 398 (adverse psychological reaction is harm suitable to environmental issues).
See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
28 Some academicians have reasoned that one generation must consider the impact
that its use of environmental resources will have on future generations. See B. ACER
MAN, supra note 24, at 212-17 (present generations are obliged to refrain from placing
members of the next generation in a worse position); J. RAWLS, THEORY OF JuSTicE 284-
93 (1971) (proper rate of saving for future generations will result in justice between
generations).
"T See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs 710-11 (God gave man dominion over the
earth to use as he sees fit).
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poet quoted by Mandelker.25 Price tags cannot be applied to
these goods. 29 Legislators are wary of such emphemeral argu-
ments. For them the most persuasive test of the unworthiness of
governmental controls is a monetized cost-benefit analysis5 0 The
efficacy of this criterion is reduced, however, when the imperfec-
tions of the marketplace, including prohibitive transaction costs,
induce the government to hypothesize the market with shadow
prices.31 The most questionable use of the cost-benefit analysis
arises when incommensurable, noneconomic values must be bal-
anced against the hard dollar claims of development. Fairness
and beauty will often be discarded in deference to such shibbo-
leths as "Big Brother," "paternalism" and "freedom from gov-
ernment intervention." 32
The author's discussion of coastal management also identi-
fies other axiological considerations that are distinct from the
above. First, Mandelker brings in horizontal equity 3 and con-
cludes that restraint on one developer, whose land falls within
the protected coastal area, creates horizontal inequity with re-
spect to unrestrained developers. The government impinges
upon its "liberty" in comparison to others. The land becomes
"8 The author quotes the poet-
A golden coast
In moonlight's star,
Forever ours!
P. 22.
" But see Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
103,119 (1979). Professor Posner postulates that everything can be monetized. He states-
"Wealth is the value in dollars or dollar equivalents... of everything in society. It is
measured by what people are willing to pay for something or, if they already own it, what
they demand in money to give it up." Id.
30 The cost benefit analysis is "a method of collecting information, processing it, and
providing a systematic approach to choosing between alternatives." Davidson, The Valu-
ation of Public Goods in Dorfman, supra note 7, at 345. Some theorists do not agree that
the cost-benefit analysis is the most convincing test. See Kennedy, supra note 13, at 407,
429.
31 See Davidson, supra note 30, at 355. See also Meyers, An Introduction to Envi-
ronmental Thought: Some Sources of Criticism, 50 IND. L. J. 426, 449 (1975) (shadow
prices by effluent charges on property interest in pollution rights); Sagoff, Do We Need a
Land Use Ethic, 3 ENvIRONMENTAL ETHics 293, 306 (1981) (shadow pricing of principles
and beliefs).
" Professor Zygmunt Plater, the plaintiff's attorney in the snail darter-endangered
suit, stated to this author. "Environmental activists rarely can make arguments based
upon the real and ecological values. They must often look for arguments in terms of
market costs."
- Pp. 16, 27-29.
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less valuable. Property value is "taken" for the benefit of soci-
ety, yet society need not pay for the gain. The due process
clause of the Constitution does not encompass such attenuated
losses and, absent extreme deprivation, the government has no
duty to compensate.3 4 A more extensive interpretation of consti-
tutional rights would reduce the horizontal inequity; compensa-
tion, ultimately derived from taxation, would more fairly dis-
tribute the costs. The government, nevertheless, has balked at
such a position if for no other reason than to keep down the
costs of improvements.
Another axiological factor is vertical equity. Mandelker es-
pouses the claims of the economically disadvantaged to a share
of the coastal housing.3 5 Is it "fair" to curtail their opportunity
by environmental regulations that increase the cost of housing?
The "harm" principle doesn't assist in the analysis: it isn't a
property harm, as traditionally viewed, to be deprived of hous-
ing owing to impecuniousness. Although one might urge a theory
of moral harm, it differs widely from the morality usually con-
sidered relevant.36
Vertical equity is more easily derived from society's value
balancing of egoism and altruism rather than between the equal-
itarian and collectivist polarity that leads to the harm princi-
ple. 7 The Western democratic preference for altruism supposes
that one ought to provide a compensatory advantage to the dis-
advantaged. 8 While vertical equity urges society to aid the dis-
advantaged, horizontal equity requires the costs not to be im-
posed disproportionately.
Mandelker's other model, exclusionary zoning, that is
designed to exclude certain economic, racial or ethnic groups
from a neighborhood, is also axiologically complex, although less
so than is coastal management. One need not confront in this
instance the incipient rights of future generations or nonhuman
34 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-3 (1978).
3 pp. 16, 27, 29-33.
36 The morality of sexual acts, abortion, suicide, and euthanasia has drawn most of
the attention. See, e.g., P. DEVLIN, supra note 22, at 22-23; B. MITCHELL, LAW, MORALITY,
AND RELIGION IN A SECULAR SocIETY (1967); Hart, supra note 23, at 49, 53.
37 See notes 15-23 and accompanying text supra.
See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 246-49; C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 108-31
(1978); J. RAWLS, supra note 26, at 14-15; Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685, 1717-22 (1976).
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life forms that are involved in coastal management controls.
Vertical equity is the primary defense here; horizontal equity is
the primary hurdle. Although the choices inherent in the regula-
tion of regulation of exclusionary zoning are less intricate than
those found in the regulation of coastal management, the intri-
cacies surrounding pollution controls are even more conducive to
finding support in traditional economic theory. The result is
that even with the exclusionary zoning model, Mandelker's read-
ership is likely to be left with a misimpression as to the general
defensibility of governmental intervention in the marketplace.
II.
It is difficult to see clearly the value of land use and envi-
ronmental controls. Even if one gains a proper perspective of the
range of reasons for regulation, the fact remains that many of
the rationales for the political decisions are nebulous, controver-
sial, and untranslatable into the economic language usually spo-
ken. As Mandelker indicates, his examples raise complex ques-
tions of justice (pp. 21-33). The elimination of exclusionary
zoning would probably be paid for primarily by the neighbors
and the housing developer in the forms of depressed property
values and reduced returns. Coastal regulations, as outlined by
Mandelker, will also effectively exact a tax from the neighbors,
the developer, and its wealthier customers. Is this fair? Can any-
thing be done about it? If not, how much is that to count?
To -gain better insight into the value of these controls, the
underlying arguments need to be further explicated. Each of the
arguments entails one or more axiological judgments. The con-
clusions are not derived deductively from self-evident prem-
ises.39 Instead, they are based upon aesthetic and ethical judg-
ments that are unsettled. Although there is substantial harmony
among members of American society as to essential values,'0 the
political scene reveals deep discord as well.
3 See M. COHEN, supra note 20, at 70-74 (1950) (reliance on maxims is misleading);
FRANKENA, ETmCS 105 (2d ed. 1973) ("belief in self-evident ethical truths, and all that
goes with it, is so difficult to defend...").
40 See E. DuRKHIM, THE DVSION Op LABoR m SocmT 79-80 (1933) (there exists a
common collective conscience, ie., beliefs and sentiments "common to average citizens of
the same society"); I. UNGEi, KNOWLEDGE MD PoLmcs 220-22, 241-48 (1975) (to extent
society constitutes a community, it is "held together by an allegiance to common
purposes").
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Once the axiological choices inherent to a public policy are
similarly identified, related, and balanced (if not absolute), a
consensus among rational people should form. When the values
at stake are settled, the decision consists primarily of logical and
empirical processes; disagreement over the facts surrounding the
policy, both as they exist at the time of the adoption and as they
will develop thereafter, can be ameliorated by scientific tech-
niques (surveys, social sciences, etc.). This is not the case where
the value choices are disputed.
The following postulate may be drawn from this analysis:
the greater the number of axiological options involved in a pol-
icy decision, and the greater their unrelatedness, the more de-
batable is the proposition. There are, of course, constellations of
values that tend to be aggregated. Those who identify them-
selves as political conservatives, for example, typically share a
range of values with others of the same persuasion. But even
then there is no complete agreement although their differences
are relatively narrow. Just as certain, people at opposite ends of
the spectrum share at least some values.41 Furthermore, for dis-
parate reasons, those with divergent values might agree upon a
specific policy by means of different axiological pathways: one
person might vote to protect an endangered species because of
"animal rights," the claims of future generations, and the desire
to maintain the balance of nature, while another person might
vote for the same proposal merely as an expedient for building a
suitable population for hunting. Although there is more than
one axiological chain of reasoning leading to a public policy, gen-
erally, the greater the number and dissimilarity of links, the
more likely are there to be incommensurable values to create un-
resolved controversy.
CONCLUSION
Mandelker has done a fine job mapping the broad contours
of environmental and land use controls. Some of the difficult de-
tail work remains unchartered. The reader, consequently, might
underestimate the virtues of some regulations and overestimate
41 See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAnv. L. REV.
593, 623 (1958) (commonality may be slight). For an analytic framework of values, see H.
LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SocmErY 55-62 (1950); J. RAWLS, supra note 26, at
40-45 (1971).
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others. Yet one message clearly comes through: "environment
and equity" are indeed regulatory challenges. They are fraught
with unresolved conflicts which will doubtlessly get worse. We
must get on with solving them.

